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Surveillance Legislation (Confirmation of Application)

Current status

This bill became law on Dec 10th, 2024.

Policy area

Law, justice & rights

What does this bill do?

The Act confirms that Australian Federal PoliceThe federal police force that ran Operation Ironside and applied for the warrants discussed on this page. material gathered under the listed Operation IronsideThe covert organised-crime investigation that used the listed warrants and later generated the evidence problem this bill deals with. warrants is legally treated as not having been intercepted over a telecommunications network.

Why was it introduced?

Challenges to AN0M evidence in court exposed doubts about whether AFPThe federal police force that ran Operation Ironside and applied for the warrants discussed on this page.-obtained Operation IronsideThe covert organised-crime investigation that used the listed warrants and later generated the evidence problem this bill deals with. messages were illegally intercepted or lawfully gathered under existing warrants. The bill confirms those specific AFPThe federal police force that ran Operation Ironside and applied for the warrants discussed on this page. warrants validly captured the messages and treats them as not intercepted over a telecommunications network.

Broader context

Between 2018 and 2021, the AFPThe federal police force that ran Operation Ironside and applied for the warrants discussed on this page. used warrants under existing surveillance and search laws to collect copied AN0M messages from servers in Australia during Operation IronsideThe covert organised-crime investigation that used the listed warrants and later generated the evidence problem this bill deals with., a major organised crime investigation that later produced hundreds of charges. When defendants in 2024 challenged whether that material had been unlawfully intercepted or validly obtained under those warrants, Parliament moved quickly to pass this narrowly targeted bill to confirm the legal status of those specific warrants, and it became law in December 2024.

Key criticism

The main criticism was that the bill retrospectively validates Operation IronsideThe covert organised-crime investigation that used the listed warrants and later generated the evidence problem this bill deals with. warrants after a legal problem emerged, raising concern that Parliament was being asked to fix a serious oversight after the fact. This reservation appears to have been raised mainly by the Greens, who said they would not try to block prosecutions but wanted to know why the flaw was not identified earlier.

Who supported it?

Mark Dreyfus MP introduced this bill. It passed on the voices.

Introduced in House 21 Nov 2024
Passed House 26 Nov 2024
Passed Senate 28 Nov 2024
Became law 10 Dec 2024

Did it become law?

Yes

Became law 10 Dec 2024

Final passage

Passed without a counted vote

Members called out ‘aye’ or ‘no’ — no individual votes were recorded.

Passage speed

19 days

From introduction to the latest recorded parliamentary step

Official record

View on APH

Parliament of Australia bill page

Meaning

What does this bill do?

  1. The Act confirms that Australian Federal PoliceThe federal police force that ran Operation Ironside and applied for the warrants discussed on this page. material gathered under the listed Operation IronsideThe covert organised-crime investigation that used the listed warrants and later generated the evidence problem this bill deals with. warrants is legally treated as not having been intercepted over a telecommunications network.

  2. The Act confirms that information obtained using the listed warrants is legally treated as having been obtained under valid warrants under the relevant surveillance or search laws.

  3. The Act applies only to a narrow set of Australian Federal PoliceThe federal police force that ran Operation Ironside and applied for the warrants discussed on this page. warrants tied to Operation IronsideThe covert organised-crime investigation that used the listed warrants and later generated the evidence problem this bill deals with., rather than changing surveillance rules more broadly.

  4. The Act does not change the general operation of Australia's interceptionOn this page, this means listening to or recording a communication while it is passing over a telecommunications system., surveillance device, or search warrantA warrant that let police search specific premises, including the sites listed in the bill, for evidence. laws outside these listed Operation IronsideThe covert organised-crime investigation that used the listed warrants and later generated the evidence problem this bill deals with. warrants.

Show source excerpts
  1. (1) Information, or a record obtained under, or purportedly under, a relevant warrant, is taken for all purposes:
    Surveillance Legislation (Confirmation of Application) Act 2024 final Act text
  2. (1) Information, or a record, obtained in reliance, or purported reliance, on a relevant warrant is taken for all purposes to have been, and to always have been, obtained under:
    Surveillance Legislation (Confirmation of Application) Act 2024 final Act text
  3. The bill is targeted in its scope and will only apply to information or records obtained under a specified range of warrants issued in connection with Operation Ironside.
    Minister's second reading speech
  4. The bill will not alter the existing law, or the operation of the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act, Surveillance Devices Act or the Crimes Act.
    Minister's second reading speech

Context

Broader context for this bill

Between 2018 and 2021, the AFPThe federal police force that ran Operation Ironside and applied for the warrants discussed on this page. used warrants under existing surveillance and search laws to collect copied AN0M messages from servers in Australia during Operation IronsideThe covert organised-crime investigation that used the listed warrants and later generated the evidence problem this bill deals with., a major organised crime investigation that later produced hundreds of charges. When defendants in 2024 challenged whether that material had been unlawfully intercepted or validly obtained under those warrants, Parliament moved quickly to pass this narrowly targeted bill to confirm the legal status of those specific warrants, and it became law in December 2024.

  1. 2018 to 2021

    AFPThe federal police force that ran Operation Ironside and applied for the warrants discussed on this page. runs Operation IronsideThe covert organised-crime investigation that used the listed warrants and later generated the evidence problem this bill deals with. using the AN0M appA messaging app used in the operation to collect copied messages for law enforcement; the bill is about the legal status of evidence taken from it.

    During Operation IronsideThe covert organised-crime investigation that used the listed warrants and later generated the evidence problem this bill deals with., the AFPThe federal police force that ran Operation Ironside and applied for the warrants discussed on this page. used warrants under the Surveillance Devices Act and Crimes Act to obtain copied AN0M messages from servers in Australia as part of covert surveillance of organised crime networks.

    Explanatory memorandum ↗
  2. June 2024

    Operation IronsideThe covert organised-crime investigation that used the listed warrants and later generated the evidence problem this bill deals with. has produced hundreds of criminal charges

    By June 2024, the operation had led to 392 alleged offenders being charged with 2,355 offences, underscoring the practical importance of the AN0M evidence in serious organised crime prosecutions.

    Hansard ↗
  3. 2024

    Challenges to AN0M evidence reach criminal courts

    Defendants challenged whether AFPThe federal police force that ran Operation Ironside and applied for the warrants discussed on this page.-obtained AN0M material had been unlawfully intercepted or lawfully gathered under existing warrants, creating uncertainty that the government said the bill needed to resolve.

    Hansard ↗
  4. 21 Nov 2024

    Government introduces the bill to confirm the warrants

    The government introduced the bill as a narrow measure aimed only at Operation IronsideThe covert organised-crime investigation that used the listed warrants and later generated the evidence problem this bill deals with. warrants so the AN0M material would be treated as lawfully obtained and not intercepted over a telecommunications system.

    Parliamentary timeline ↗
  5. 28 Nov 2024

    Parliament passes the bill

    Both houses passed the bill in the same form, completing its parliamentary passage after a fast legislative response to the evidentiary uncertainty.

    Parliamentary timeline ↗
  6. 10 Dec 2024

    Royal AssentThe final step that turned the bill into an Act after Parliament passed it. makes the confirmation law

    Royal AssentThe final step that turned the bill into an Act after Parliament passed it. turned the bill into an Act, locking in the legal treatment of the specified Operation IronsideThe covert organised-crime investigation that used the listed warrants and later generated the evidence problem this bill deals with. warrants and the information obtained under them.

    Parliamentary timeline ↗

Legislative route

How did it move through Parliament?

House Senate
Introduced 21 Nov 2024

The bill was formally presented to the chamber and read a first time, which starts its parliamentary journey.

Introduced and read a first time

Second reading opened 21 Nov 2024

A minister or sponsoring member moved the second reading, opening the main debate on the bill's purpose and principles.

Second reading moved

Second reading debate 26 Nov 2024

The bill reached this recorded parliamentary step.

Sent to Federation Chamber for debate 26 Nov 2024

The bill reached this recorded parliamentary step. For this bill, the Federation Chamber reported back later the same day and the House then completed its remaining formal steps that day.

Referred to Federation Chamber

Federation Chamber debate 26 Nov 2024

The bill reached this recorded parliamentary step.

Second reading debate

House second reading agreed 26 Nov 2024

The chamber agreed to the bill at second reading, meaning it accepted the bill in principle and allowed it to continue.

Second reading agreed to

House agreed to amendment packages 26 Nov 2024

The chamber considered amendments before the bill moved to the next stage.

Consideration in detail debate

Returned from Federation Chamber without amendment 26 Nov 2024

The bill reached this recorded parliamentary step. The official House record shows the referral out and return both happened on the same day, before the House moved to its final formal votes.

Reported from Federation Chamber

House third reading agreed 26 Nov 2024

The chamber agreed to the bill at third reading, which completed passage through that chamber.

Third reading agreed to

Scrutiny of Bills review 27 Nov 2024

Considered by scrutiny committee (27/11/2024): Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills; Scrutiny Digest 15 of 2024. The committee drew senators' attention to the retrospective validation of information obtained under relevant Operation IronsideThe covert organised-crime investigation that used the listed warrants and later generated the evidence problem this bill deals with. warrants.

Considered by scrutiny committee

APH bill page notes and Scrutiny Digest 15 of 2024
Introduced 28 Nov 2024

The bill was formally presented to the chamber and read a first time, which starts its parliamentary journey.

Introduced and read a first time

Second reading opened 28 Nov 2024

A minister or sponsoring member moved the second reading, opening the main debate on the bill's purpose and principles.

Second reading moved

Senate second reading agreed 28 Nov 2024

The chamber agreed to the bill at second reading, meaning it accepted the bill in principle and allowed it to continue.

Second reading agreed to

Senate third reading agreed 28 Nov 2024

The chamber agreed to the bill at third reading, which completed passage through that chamber.

Third reading agreed to

Passed both houses 28 Nov 2024

Both houses passed the bill in the same form, completing parliamentary passage.

Finally passed both Houses

Assent 10 Dec 2024

The Governor-General gave Royal AssentThe final step that turned the bill into an Act after Parliament passed it., turning the bill into an Act.

Human Rights review 05 Feb 2025

Considered by scrutiny committee (05/02/2025): Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights; Report 1 of 2025. The committee discussed privacy and fair-trial issues raised by retrospectively validating Operation IronsideThe covert organised-crime investigation that used the listed warrants and later generated the evidence problem this bill deals with. warrants.

Considered by scrutiny committee

APH bill page notes and Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights Report 1 of 2025

Key criticism

The main case against this bill

The main criticism was that the bill retrospectively validates Operation IronsideThe covert organised-crime investigation that used the listed warrants and later generated the evidence problem this bill deals with. warrants after a legal problem emerged, raising concern that Parliament was being asked to fix a serious oversight after the fact. This reservation appears to have been raised mainly by the Greens, who said they would not try to block prosecutions but wanted to know why the flaw was not identified earlier.

No party represented in the debate appears to have opposed the bill outright.

Retrospective fix for a legal oversight

Critics argued the bill retrospectively validates AFPThe federal police force that ran Operation Ironside and applied for the warrants discussed on this page. warrants connected to Operation IronsideThe covert organised-crime investigation that used the listed warrants and later generated the evidence problem this bill deals with., which raised concern that Parliament was being asked to repair a legal defect only after prosecutions were underway. The concern was less about the bill's crime-fighting goal than about why the problem was not detected earlier and corrected sooner.

Raised by Max Chandler-Mather and the Greens Source ↗

Further sources

parlinfo.aph.gov.au ↗

Votes

Recorded votes

How the bill itself passed

The bill passed both chambers on the voices, so there is no list of individual Aye and No votes for final passage.

Passed

House passed the bill

House agreed to the bill's third reading on the voices, so there is no list of individual Aye and No votes for final passage in that chamber.

26 Nov 2024

Passed on the voices

In a voice vote, members call out Aye or No and the presiding officer judges which side has it. Individual names are only recorded if a formal division is called.

Passed

Senate passed the bill

Senate agreed to the bill's third reading on the voices, so there is no list of individual Aye and No votes for final passage in that chamber.

28 Nov 2024

Passed on the voices

In a voice vote, members call out Aye or No and the presiding officer judges which side has it. Individual names are only recorded if a formal division is called.

Amendments at a glance

These amendments were agreed on the voices without a counted division.

House

Carried

Correct surveillance code reference

This amendment would change the bill text to replace “SDC003” with “SDC0003” as a technical correction.

26 Nov 2024

This amendment would change the bill text to replace “SDC003” with “SDC0003” as a technical correction.

Passed on the voices

The chamber agreed to this amendment without a counted vote — the presiding officer judged the ayes louder than the noes, and no member called for a division.

Amendment text ↗

Parliamentary debate

Who spoke, and what they said

Start here — lead voices

Sponsor speech Supports

Mark Dreyfus

Australian Labor Party • MP 21 Nov 2024

Dreyfus supports the bill and says it is a narrow clarification that confirms evidence gathered in Operation IronsideThe covert organised-crime investigation that used the listed warrants and later generated the evidence problem this bill deals with. was lawfully obtained.

Read in Hansard ↗
Lead supporting voice Supports

Paul Fletcher

Liberal Party • MP 26 Nov 2024

Paul Fletcher supports the bill because it clarifies the law for a limited set of ANOMA messaging app used in the operation to collect copied messages for law enforcement; the bill is about the legal status of evidence taken from it. warrants in a way he says matches the courts and will help police continue investigating and prosecuting organised crime.

Read in Hansard ↗
Lead voice Unclear

Max Chandler-Mather

Australian Greens • MP 26 Nov 2024

Chandler-Mather says the Greens will not try to block the Operation IronsideThe covert organised-crime investigation that used the listed warrants and later generated the evidence problem this bill deals with. prosecutions, but they are critical of the bill's retrospective validation of the AFPThe federal police force that ran Operation Ironside and applied for the warrants discussed on this page. warrants and want an explanation for why the legal problem was not found earlier.

Read in Hansard ↗

All speeches by bloc

Labor

1 speaker · 2 contributions · 1 support

  1. Mark Dreyfus ★ 2 contributions Dreyfus supports the bill and says it is a narrow clarification that confirms evidence gathered in Operation IronsideThe covert organised-crime investigation that used the listed warrants and later generated the evidence problem this bill deals with. was lawfully obtained.

    Hansard records 2 separate contributions by Mark Dreyfus on this bill. They are grouped here so the speaker is listed once.

    Minister's second reading speech Australian Labor Party • MP • 21 Nov 2024

    Dreyfus supports the bill and says it is a narrow clarification that confirms evidence gathered in Operation IronsideThe covert organised-crime investigation that used the listed warrants and later generated the evidence problem this bill deals with. was lawfully obtained. He argues it gives certainty without changing the existing law and is consistent with the courts and parliament's intent.

    “The bill will provide certainty by clarifying that the activities in question were undertaken in a manner that was consistent with parliament's intent when enacting the relevant provisions of the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act, Surveillance Devices Act and the Crimes Act.”
    Read this contribution in Hansard ↗

    Second reading speech Australian Labor Party • MP • 26 Nov 2024

    Dreyfus supports the bill, saying it clarifies that information collected under specified Operation IronsideThe covert organised-crime investigation that used the listed warrants and later generated the evidence problem this bill deals with. warrants was not intercepted under the telecommunications law. He emphasises that it is narrowly targeted and affects no other AFPThe federal police force that ran Operation Ironside and applied for the warrants discussed on this page. operations.

    “This bill makes clear that information collected under specified warrants independently issued to the Australian Federal Police under the Surveillance Devices Act 2004 and the Crimes Act 1914 in connection with Operation Ironside was not intercepted while passing over a telecommunication system within the meaning of the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979.”
    Read this contribution in Hansard ↗

Coalition

1 speaker · 1 support

  1. Paul Fletcher ★ Paul Fletcher supports the bill because it clarifies the law for a limited set of ANOMA messaging app used in the operation to collect copied messages for law enforcement; the bill is about the legal status of evidence taken from it. warrants in a way he says matches the courts and will help police continue investigating and prosecuting organised crime.
    “What this bill does is clarify the operation of the law in a way that is consistent with the position taken by the courts to date in relation to a limited number of specified warrants. This certainly is welcome and no doubt will assist in the continued investigation and prosecution of criminal organisations which profit from harming the Australian community. I thank the House.”

    Liberal Party • MP • 26 Nov 2024

    Read the full speech in Hansard ↗

Greens

1 speaker · 1 unclear

  1. Max Chandler-Mather ★ Chandler-Mather says the Greens will not try to block the Operation IronsideThe covert organised-crime investigation that used the listed warrants and later generated the evidence problem this bill deals with. prosecutions, but they are critical of the bill's retrospective validation of the AFPThe federal police force that ran Operation Ironside and applied for the warrants discussed on this page. warrants and want an explanation for why the legal problem was not found earlier.
    “The Greens do not want to stand in the way of the prosecutions for Operation Ironside, but we do want answers about why this legal impediment was not uncovered many years ago if this operation was properly considered and passed through legal channels in the AFP.”

    Australian Greens • MP • 26 Nov 2024

    Read the full speech in Hansard ↗

Record

Full record

Full chat